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Abstract Given a labelled transition system G partially observed by an at-
tacker, and a regular predicate Sec over the runs of G, enforcing opacity of
the secret Sec in G means computing a supervisory controller K such that an
attacker who observes a run of the controlled system K/G cannot ascertain
that the trace of this run belongs to Sec based on the knowledge of G and K.
We lift the problem from a single labelled transition system G to the class of
all labelled transition systems specified by a Modal Transition System M . The
lifted problem is to compute the maximally permissive controller K such that
Sec is opaque in K/G for every labelled transition system G which is a model
of M . The situations of the attacker and of the controller are asymmetric: at
run time, the attacker may fully know G and K whereas the controller knows
only M and the sequence of actions executed so far by the unknown G. We
address the problem in two cases. Let Σa denote the set of actions that can
be observed by the attacker, and let Σc and Σo denote the sets of actions
that can be controlled and observed by the controller, respectively. We pro-
vide optimal and regular controllers that enforce the opacity of regular secrets
when Σc ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σa = Σ. We provide optimal and regular controllers that
enforce the opacity of regular upper-closed secrets (Sec = Sec.Σ∗) under the
following assumptions: (i) Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σo = Σ or (ii) Σa, Σc ⊆ Σo = Σ and
wσ ∈ Sec⇒ w ∈ Sec for all σ ∈ Σ \Σc.
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1 Introduction
The concept of opacity, first introduced in the context of sessions of security
protocols [13, 12], was later extended to transition systems [3]. A predicate
over the runs of a transition system is opaque w.r.t. an observation function
if every observation produced by a run that satisfies the predicate is also pro-
duced by some run that does not satisfy the predicate. The concept of opacity
is very flexible as it depends both on the class of predicates and on the obser-
vation function. By adjusting these two parameters, many common security
properties (e.g., confidentiality, anonymity) can be rephrased in terms of opac-
ity [3, 10]. In general, opacity is undecidable but this property may be checked
effectively when it is applied to regular predicates on runs of finite transition
systems and with observation functions induced by projection operators. Al-
gorithms for checking opacity in Discrete Event Systems (DES) are presented
together with applications in [18, 20, 10].
An active and hot topic at the frontier of the theories of security and DES is
the search for supervisory controllers that enforce the opacity of a predicate on
a given transition system. As noted in [8], long-term motivation for such work
may be found in the need to protect SCADA systems and networks of sen-
sors and actuators from interference with malicious agents through TCP/IP.
If the sequences of messages sent from the SCADA system allows an attacker
to know that the system, e.g., a power grid, is close to becoming unstable,
then a sudden increase of load, e.g., a surge of power demand, can lead to
disastrous consequences. However, until now the literature has dealt exclu-
sively with finite transition systems. Approaches differ by considering either
state-based opacity, e.g., initial-state opacity [18, 17] or current-state opacity
[8], or language-based opacity [1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 20, 21]. With state opacity, the
secret predicate bears either upon the initial state, or upon the current state,
or upon the set of all states that have been visited from the beginning of a
run. With language opacity, the secret predicate is a set of sequences of ac-
tions that label transitions. Language opacity and current-state opacity are
mutually reducible. Approaches also differ upon whether synthesis algorithms
or closed formulas or both are provided for maximally permissive controllers
enforcing opacity. Closed formulas are proposed in [2, 21, 20]. In fine, all ap-
proaches rely on Ramadge and Wonham’s basic theory of supervisory control
for DES [15, 14, 16]. Significant adaptations must, however, be brought to
the basic theory, because opacity objectives do not reduce to safety and live-
ness. In fact, opacity objectives are not concerned with individual runs but
with sets of indiscernible runs from the perspective of the attacker. Classes of
indiscernible runs may be captured by estimators, as is usually done for the
purpose of diagnosis. Closely related to the concept of opacity is the concept of
secrecy (both a predicate and the complement of this predicate have to be kept
secret). In [20] conditions under which secrecy can be ensured are provided.
In [19], controller synthesis algorithms are proposed for initial state-opacity
and infinite-step opacity. Finally, although not specifically concerned with con-
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trol, the aim of [22] is to enforce opacity by inserting additional observable
events in the system’s output behavior.
In this paper, we lift the opacity enforcing control problem from finite
transition systems to families of finite transition systems specified by modal
transition systems. Modal transition systems were introduced in [9] as tuples
(S,Σ,→,→♦, s0) with two modal transition relations → (the strong or
must transition relation) and →♦ (the weak or may transition relation), both
included in S×Σ×S and subject to the inclusion constraint→⊆→♦. A Modal
Transition System (MTS) should be understood as a logical formula, with
labelled transition systems as models. Modal transition systems are indeed
a well-identified fragment of the modal µ-calculus [7]. Intuitively, a Labelled
Transition System (LTS) is a model of an MTS if there exists a relation |=
between their respective sets of states Q and S such that q0 |= s0 holds for the
initial states and whenever q |= s, for q ∈ Q and s ∈ S, all must transitions
from s are simulated by transitions from q, all transitions from q are simulated
by may transitions from s and |= is preserved under simulation of transitions
in both directions.
Example 1 The modal transition systems M1 and M2 depicted in Figure 1,
where the relations → and →♦ are represented with solid lines and dashed
lines, respectively, state that the presence of the first transition a is mandatory
in any model ofM2 while it is optional in models ofM1. The second transition
a is optional for both MTS, and any model of M1 or M2 must be able to
perform a b after the sequence a.a has been executed. The presence of a second
transition b (returning to the initial state of M1 or M2) is optional in models
of M1 or M2.
The two LTS depicted in Figure 1(c) and 1(d) are models of M1, whereas
they are not models of M2. Indeed, after the initial transition a, M2 requires
a transition b, which is missing in G1 and G2. ⋄
We frequently use systems without an exact knowledge of their behaviour.
This is generally the case when the system belongs to a range of products
with many versions, such as applications for smart phones or software, and
even more so for software with automatic updates. This is also the case when
the system is a web service orchestration, selected on request by a broker to
match operating guidelines specified in the request [11]. For instance, when
you use a web service orchestration to buy goods online and find yourself
short of funds to complete your transaction, you may want this information to
be opaque to the orchestrator. Opacity may be obtained, e.g., by letting the
online payment service interact with the orchestrator by the same return event
when an incorrect PIN has been entered or when a bank account balance is
too low for payment. In such situations, modal transition systems may serve to
represent the partial knowledge of the user on the possible behaviours of the
system (modal transition systems with final states, introduced in [4], are in
fact a restricted form of the operating guidelines of [11]). Enforcing opacity of
regular predicates on modal transition systems may then serve to prevent con-
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Fig. 1 Two modal transition systems M1, M2 and two labelled transition systems G1, G2.
fidential user information from being leaked by the partially-unknown system
which they actually use.
The purpose of this paper differs from the purpose of our earlier paper [4].
In [4], the goal was to enforce specifications of service, expressed by modal
transition systems, on service providers, modelled by LTS. Here the goal is
to enforce the opacity of a secret predicate on all models LTS of a modal
transition system MTS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we recall briefly the
background of modal transition systems and supervisory control for opacity,
and we state the opacity enforcement problem for modal transition systems.
The parameters of the problem are the secret predicate, the subset of actions
Σa that the attacker can observe, and the subsets of actions Σo and Σc that
the controller can observe and control, respectively. Then, we address the
opacity enforcement problem for regular secrets in the most straightforward
case Σc ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σa = Σ. In the main and last technical section of the paper,
we provide optimal and regular controllers that enforce the opacity of regular
upper-closed secrets (Sec = Sec.Σ∗) for modal transition systems under the
following assumptions:
(i) Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σo = Σ or
(ii) Σa, Σc ⊆ Σo = Σ and wσ ∈ Sec⇒ w ∈ Sec for all σ ∈ Σ \Σc.
2 Transition Systems and opacity
In this section we recall the background of labelled transition systems and
opacity.
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2.1 Labelled Transition Systems and their languages
A (finite) deterministic labelled transition system over Σ is a 4-tuple G =
(Q,Σ, δ, q0) where Q is a finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, Σ is the
alphabet of actions, and δ is a partial map from Q×Σ to Q, called the labelled
transition map. This map is extended inductively to δ : Q×Σ∗ → Q by letting
δ(q, ε) = q (where ε is the empty word) and δ(q, w.σ) = δ(δ(q, w), σ) for all
q ∈ Q, w ∈ Σ∗ and σ ∈ Σ (w.σ denotes the word acquired by appending σ
to w. In the sequel, we let w.w′ denote the concatenation of the words w and
w′ and we let w.L′ = {w.w′ |w′ ∈ L′} and L.L′ = {w.w′ |w ∈ L ∧ w′ ∈ L′}.
A state q ∈ Q is reachable (from q0) if δ(q0, w) = q for some word w ∈ Σ
∗.
G is finite if Q and Σ are finite; it is reduced if all states in Q are reachable
and every event σ ∈ Σ is enabled at some state q, i.e., δ(q, σ) is defined in this
state. In the sequel, we consider only finite and reduced labelled transition
systems. G is said to be complete if δ(q, σ) is defined for all q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ.
The language of G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) is the set of words
L(G) = {w ∈ Σ∗ | δ(q0, w) defined}.
For q ∈ Q, we let L(G, q), the language generated by G from state q, be defined
as:
L(G, q) = {w ∈ Σ∗ | δ(q, w) defined}.
For F ⊆ Q, we let LF (G), the set of sequences recognized by states in F , be
defined as:
LF (G) = {w ∈ Σ
∗ | δ(qo, w) ∈ F}
Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗ and a sub-alphabet Σa ⊆ Σ, the natural projec-
tion of L on Σ∗a is the language pia(L) ⊆ Σ
∗
a equal to {pia(w) |w ∈ L} where
pia is the operation from Σ
∗ to Σ∗a that erases in words of Σ
∗ all events not
in Σa. Formally, pia is defined inductively by:
– pia(ε) = ε (the empty word),
– pia(w.σ) = pia(w).σ for w ∈ Σ
∗ and σ ∈ Σa,
– pia(w.σ) = pia(w) for w ∈ Σ
∗ and σ /∈ Σa.
For w, w′ ∈ Σ∗, we let w ∼a w
′ be an abbreviation for pia(w) = pia(w
′).
Finally, given transition systems G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) and G
′ = (Q′, Σ, δ′, q′0)
labelled over the same alphabet Σ, their product is the (reachable restriction
of the) labelled transition system G×G′ = (Q×Q′, Σ, δ × δ′, (q0, q
′
0)) where
(δ × δ′)((q, q′), σ) = (δ(q, σ), δ′(q′, σ)).
2.2 Opacity
Consider an LTS G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) over Σ and Σa ⊆ Σ. The alphabet Σa ⊆ Σ
defines the set of actions that the attacker can observe. Let Sec ⊆ Σ∗ be a
regular predicate, called the secret, that represents confidential information
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on the execution of G. To catch this confidential information, the attacker is
armed with full knowledge on the structure of G but only partial knowledge
of its dynamic behavior, namely the information afforded by the natural pro-
jection on Σ∗a of the actual sequence in Σ
∗ generated by G. In this framework,
we assume that the attacker passively observes the system and hence does not
interact with it, i.e., the flow information is as follows:
System G Attacker A
Σa ⊆ Σ
For secret predicates given as regular languages, the definition of opacity in-
troduced in [3] may be adapted as follows.
Definition 1 Given a secret Sec ∈ Reg(Σ∗), Sec is opaque in G w.r.t. Σa
if, ∀w ∈ L(G) ∩ Sec, ∃w′ ∈ L(G) \ Sec such that w ∼a w
′.
Intuitively, a secret is opaque if every secret word w is observationally equiva-
lent to at least one non secret word w′of the system. If Sec is not opaque then
there is an information flow from the system to the attacker.
Definition 2 Given a word w ∈ Sec ∩ L(G), w discloses the secret Sec if
w ∼a w
′ ⇒ w′ ∈ Sec for all words w′ ∈ L(G).
Example 2 Let G be the LTS of Figure 2, where Σ = {h, p, a, b}, Σa = {a, b}.
p
h
a
a
b a, b
a, b
a, b
Fig. 2 Breaking the secrecy of h.
The secret that should not be revealed is the occurrence of the (unobservable)
action h (namely, Sec = Σ∗.h.Σ∗). As h.b ∈ Sec is the sole word in L(G)
compatible with the partial observation b, h.b discloses the secret Sec, hence
Sec is not opaque w.r.t. G and Σa. ⋄
2.3 Supervisory Control for Opacity
Given a Secret Sec on the system G, the goal of supervisory control is to
enforce the secrecy of Sec on G by pairing this system with a supervisory
controller modeled by an LTS that observes a subset Σo of the actions in Σ
and controls a subset Σc of the actions in Σ following the scheme of Figure 3.
Thus, enforcing the opacity of the secret Sec w.r.t. Σa in G means computing
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System G Attacker AController K
Σa
Σo
Σc
Fig. 3 Control Architecture
a supervisory controller K such that Sec is opaque w.r.t. Σa in the product
G×K1, called the controlled system and usually written K/G.
In Ramadge and Wonham’s setting for supervisory control [15, 14, 16], an
admissible controller K may be seen as an LTS K = (X,Σ, δK , x0), subject
to constraints parametric on two subsets of actions Σc and Σo.
1. Controllability constraint: the first set Σc is comprised of the controllable
actions that the controller can block or control. For any uncontrollable
action σ ∈ Σ \ Σc = Σuc and for any word w, if δK(x0, w) = x and
wσ ∈ L(G) then δK(x, σ) must be defined. In other words, we should have
L(K).Σuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ L(K).
2. Observability constraint: the second set Σo is comprised of the actions that
the controller can observe. For any action σ /∈ Σo and for any state x in
which δK(x, σ) is defined, it is required that δK(x, σ) = x.
K† is said to be maximally permissive among the controllers that enforce the
opacity of Sec in G w.r.t. Σa if L(K/G) ⊆ L(K
†/G) for all such controllers
K.
Next, we illustrate the (intuition behind the) computation of opacity en-
forcing controllers through a simple example.
Example 3 The system to be controlled is given in Figure 4 with Σ = {a, c1, c2,
b, d, e, h, p}. We assume that Σa = {a, b, d, e}, Σo = {a, c1, c2, b, d, e}, and
Σc = {b, c1, c2, e} (thus Σuc = {a, d, e, h, p}). The secret is given by the reg-
ular language Sec = Σ∗.h.Σ∗. When observing d, the attacker knows that h
0 1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11
a
p
c1
e
b
h
d
a c2
e
a
h
h
b
e
a
a
Fig. 4 Original system G.
1 The language generated by G×K is given by L(K) ∩ L(G).
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occurred and the secret is revealed (in state 5). By control, action c1 has to be
disabled, thus avoiding the triggering of the subsequent uncontrollable sequence
h.d, and the LTS depicted in Figure 5(a) is obtained.
0 1
6 7 8 9 10
11
a
p
e
a c2
e
h
h
b
e
a
(a) Step 1
0 1
6 7
11
a
p
e
a
e
he
(b) Step 2
0 1
a
h, p e, h, p
(c) Controller K
Fig. 5 Controller K Computation
However, after the observation of the action b, the secret is now revealed to
the attacker who knows the control law. By control, action c2 has to be disabled,
giving the LTS of Figure 5(b). The secret is now opaque with respect to this
LTS. The resulting controller K is depicted in Figure 5(c). ⋄
The previous example suggests that to compute the controllerK, it is sufficient
to remove from G, using the standard Ramadge & Wonham algorithm, the
sequences that reveal the secret, i.e. the language L(G) \pi−1a ◦pia(L(G) \Sec)
and to iterate the process until Sec is opaque w.r.t. the resulting LTS (iteration
is mandatory as removing some behaviors of G by control might create new
information flow). However, it has been shown in [5] that this iteration might
not terminate, even though the maximally permissive controller K† exists.
Furthermore, knowing whether the maximal controller is regular under the
sole assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo is still an open question. Meanwhile, in [5], it
was shown that there exists a maximally permissive and regular controller K†
in all cases where Σc ⊆ Σo and Σa compares with Σc and Σo. In [6], more
elaborate constructions were presented for computing K† in the case where
Σc ⊆ Σo and Σa ⊆ Σo.
Alternatively, [21] provides a method for computing the supremal con-
trolled system ensuring the opacity of a secret Sec when Σo = Σ and (∀w,w
′ ∈
L(G))(∀σ ∈ Σuc ∩Σa)pia(w) = pia(w
′) ∧ wσ ∈ L(G)⇒ w′σ ∈ L(G).
Note that [5] and [6] provide effective synthesis algorithms solving the
opacity control problem (i.e., they compute the maximally permissive con-
troller K†), whereas [21] provides closed formulae characterizing the behavior
K†/G without explicitly computing K†.
Remark 1 Closely related to the concept of opacity is the concept of secrecy
(both a predicate and the complement of this predicate have to be kept secret).
In [20] conditions under which secrecy can be ensured are provided. Similarly,
[19] provides algorithms to compute controllers ensuring initial-state opacity
(preventing the attacker from inferring one of the initial states of the system
after some observation) as well as infinite-step opacity (preventing the attacker
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from inferring that the system was in the secret in the past after some fixed
number of steps).
3 Modal Transition Systems and opacity control problem
In this paper, we make a first step towards extending the results of section 2.3
to systems modeled by modal transition systems (MTS). We first introduce
the formal definition of MTS and then describe the opacity control problem
in this setting.
3.1 Modal Transition Systems [9]
Definition 3 A deterministic modal transition system (or MTS) over Σ is a
5-tuple M = (S,Σ, δ, δ♦, s0) where
– S is a finite set of logical states with s0 the initial state,
– Σ is the alphabet of actions
– δ : S × Σ → S and δ♦ : S × Σ → S are two partial maps, called the
strong and the weak labelled transition maps, respectively, subject to the
constraint δ ⊆ δ♦.
The maps δ and δ♦ are extended inductively to words as was done with
the transition maps of labelled transition systems. For any modal transition
system M , we let L(M) = L(M) where M = (S,Σ, δ♦, s0), thus M denotes
the LTS whose transition map is the weak transition map ofM . Similarly,M =
(S,Σ, δ, s0) denotes the LTS whose transition map is the strong transition
map of M .
A modal transition system M determines a family of labelled transition
systems G called its models (notation: G |= MTS).
Definition 4 A labelled transition system G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) is a model of
M = (S,Σ, δ, δ♦, s0) if there exists a relation |=⊆ Q × S such that q0 |= s0
and for all q ∈ Q and s ∈ S, q |= s entails the following for all σ ∈ Σ:
– if δ(q, σ) is defined then δ♦(s, σ) is defined and δ(q, σ) |= δ♦(s, σ),
– if δ(s, σ) is defined then δ(q, σ) is defined and δ(q, σ) |= δ(s, σ).
Example 4 In example 1, G1 |=M1 as we can build a relation |=⊆ Q×S equal
to {(A, 1), (B, 2), (C, 3), (D, 4), (E, 1), (F, 2), (G, 3), (H, 4), (I, 2), (J, 2)))} that
fulfills the conditions of Definition 4. ⋄
With these definitions, it can be shown that
M |=M, M |=M, G |=M ⇒ L(M) ⊆ L(G) ⊆ L(M).
Therefore,
L(M) =
⋂
{L(G) |G |=M} and L(M) =
⋃
{L(G) |G |=M}.
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L(M) and L(M) are called the infimum and supremum of L(G), respectively,
for all G |= M However, M and M are not the unique models of M with
minimal or maximal language, respectively, since there may exist other LTS
with the same language.
A central property of modal transition systems is stated by the following
relation:
G1 |=M ∧G2 |=M ⇒ G1 ×G2 |=M.
Furthermore, it can be shown that given two LTS G1 and G2 such that
L(G1) = L(G2) and an MTS M , if G1 |= M then G2 |= M . This result holds
because we only consider deterministic labelled transition systems.
We refer the reader to [9, 7] for more information on the theory of the
modal transition systems.
In addition to these reminders, we introduce now a specific construction
used in later proofs. Given a modal transition system M , for each word w ∈
L(M) we want to construct a labelled transition system w ◦ M such that
L(w◦M) is the infimum of L(G) for all labelled transition systems G satisfying
G |=M and w ∈ L(G).
Definition 5 Given w = σ1 . . . σn ∈ L(M) where M = (S,Σ, δ
, δ♦, s0),
let w ◦ M denote the LTS produced by the following procedure, where si =
δ♦(s0, σ1 . . . σi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
– make n+1 separate copies of the set of states S with elements (s, i), s ∈ S
and 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
– for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let δ((si−1, i− 1), σi) = (si, i),
– for 0 ≤ i ≤ n and for all pairs (s, σ) ∈ S×Σ such that i = n or (s 6= si or
σ 6= σi+1), let δ((s, i), σ) = (δ
(s, σ), i),
– let (s0, 0) be the initial state and δ be the partial transition map,
– remove all unreachable states.
Example 5 To illustrate this construction, let us consider the word a.a. Then
(a.a) ◦M1 is given by the following LTS for which only the reachable part is
kept. ⋄
Lemma 1 For w = ε (the empty word), ε ◦ M is isomorphic to M . For
any other word w, the LTS w ◦ M enjoys the properties w ◦ M |= M and
w ∈ L(w ◦M).
Lemma 2 For any word w.σ ∈ L(M) with w ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ and δ♦(s0, w.σ) =
s, the language of the labelled transition system (w.σ) ◦M is equal to L(w ◦
M) ∪ w.σ.L(M, s).
Proposition 1 L(w ◦M) =
⋂
{L(G) |G |=M ∧ w ∈ L(G)}.
Proof. In view of Lemma 1, it suffices to show that G |= M ∧ w ∈ L(G) ⇒
L(w ◦M) ⊆ L(G). The proof is by induction on w. For w = ε, this holds
since L(ε ◦M) = L(M). For any other word w.σ ∈ L(M) with σ ∈ Σ, by
Lemma 2, L((w.σ)◦M) = L(w◦M)∪w.σ.L(M, s). By induction, L(w◦M) ⊆
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Fig. 6 (a.a) ◦M1
⋂
{L(G) |G |= M ∧ w ∈ L(G)} ⊆
⋂
{L(G) |G |= M ∧ w.σ ∈ L(G)}. By
definition of the relation |=, G |=M ∧w.σ ∈ L(G)⇒ w.σ.L(M, s) ⊆ L(G) for
any labelled transition system G. Hence L((w.σ) ◦M) ⊆ L(G) and the proof
is complete. 
Based on Proposition 1, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Given Sec ∈ Reg(Σ∗) and w ∈ Sec, w discloses the secret Sec in
some model G of M if and only if w discloses the secret Sec in w ◦M .
3.2 The Opacity Control Problem for Modal Transition Systems
From now on, M = (S,Σ, δ, δ♦, s0) is a fixed modal transition system, and
Sec is a fixed regular subset of Σ∗, called the secret. Let Σa be the subset
of actions in Σ that can be observed by the attacker. Let Σo and Σc be the
subsets of actions in Σ that may be observed or blocked by the controller,
respectively.
Definition 6 K = (X,Σ, δK , x0) enforces the opacity of Sec in M w.r.t. Σa
if for every labelled transition system G over Σ such that G |=M ,
1. K is an admissible controller of G (w.r.t. Σo and Σc) and,
2. Sec is opaque in K/G (w.r.t. Σa).
As for permissivity, it would not make any sense to require that K† be max-
imally permissive for every model G of M (among the controllers K that
enforce the opacity of Sec in G w.r.t. Σa). In the framework of opacity control
for modal transition systems, we shall consider the following definition:
Definition 7 K† is maximally permissive if L(K/G) ⊆ L(K†/G) for every
controller K that enforces the opacity of Sec in M (w.r.t. Σa) and for every
model G of M .
With regard to the above definitions, the opacity control problem can be stated
as follows:
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Problem 1 Given a modal transition system M , a regular secret Sec ⊆ Σ∗,
Σa ⊆ Σ (the actions observed by the attacker), Σo ⊆ Σ and Σc ⊆ Σ (the
observable and controllable actions of the controller, respectively), build a max-
imally permissive controller K† enforcing the opacity of Sec in M w.r.t. Σa.
Let us illustrate the opacity control problem and the notion of permissivity
through an example:
Example 6 Consider the MTS M1 of Example 1 and assume that the secret is
given by the regular language Sec = Σ∗.a.a.b.b.Σ∗ and that Σa = Σc = {a}.
Sec is opaque w.r.t. G2 and Σa but not opaque w.r.t. G1 and Σa since by
observing a.a.a.a, the attacker knows that the actual word executed is either
a.a.b.b.a.a or a.a.b.b.a.a.b, both of which are in Sec. Now let us consider the
controller K depicted in Figure 7. It can be shown that K is an admissible
a a
ba
a
b
a
b
b
a
b
b
Fig. 7 Admissible controller K
controller ensuring the opacity of Sec in G1 and G2 (we will show in Section 4
that K is indeed the maximally permissive controller enforcing the opacity of
Sec in M1). The resulting controlled LTS K/G1 and K/G2 are depicted in
Figure 8. Intuitively, in G1, K disables the fourth occurrence of a in a.a.b.b.a.a
a a b b a
a
(a) K/G1
a a b b a
a
b
a b a
a
b
b
(b) K/G2
Fig. 8 Controlled LTS
since this occurrence of a would leak the secret. The controller K is maximally
permissive for enforcing the opacity of Sec in G1 (observing three occurrences
of a does not reveal Sec). In G2, K disables the second a in b.a.a.b if b.a.b
has not be observed so far. However, the controller K is not the maximally
permissive controller enforcing the opacity of Sec in G2, as Sec was already
opaque for G2. Overall, as the controller does not know whether the actual
plant is G1 or G2 (although the attacker knows it), the controller has to always
disable the fourth a in the word a.a.b.b.a.a. ⋄
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The previous example illustrates the fact that if the controller does not know
which model of M is actually implemented whereas the attacker does know,
then the controller must enforce opacity of Sec uniformly in all such models
of M .
In the following section, we address the case in which a maximally per-
missive and regular controller K† enforcing the opacity of Sec in M can be
constructed.
4 Computing K† for regular upper-closed secrets
There is a somewhat trivial case to consider when the attacker has full ob-
servation of the system (i.e., Σc ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σa = Σ). In this case we simply
compute, in accordance with Ramadge and Wonham’s theory [15, 14, 16], the
maximally permissive K† for M and the expected behaviour L(M) \ Sec.
In this section, we assume that the secret Sec is upper-closed w.r.t. the
prefix-order on words, i.e., Sec = Sec.Σ∗. That is, once the secret is disclosed,
it is disclosed forever. This assumption, also made in [1], implies that the goal
of the opacity game is not to permit the attacker to ascertain that some prefix
of the partially observed run of the LTS was in the secret. We make other two
alternative working assumptions.
(1) Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σo = Σ, or
(2) Σa, Σc ⊆ Σo = Σ and w /∈ Sec ∧ wσ ∈ Sec⇒ σ ∈ Σc.
Under these assumptions, the attacker has partial observation, whereas the
controller has full observation and can block every action that (1) reveals (i.e.,
all controllable events are observable) or (2) enters the secret (i.e., an event
that would allow access to the secret can always be disabled). This gives a
strong advantage to the controller over the attacker, but remember that the
controller ignores which LTS is executing among all models of the given MTS,
whereas the attacker knows.
4.1 Incorporating the secret with the modal transition system
As a first step towards computing controllers, we incorporate the predicate Sec
with the modal transition system M . To do so, we combine the modal transi-
tion system M = (S,Σ, δ, δ♦, s0) and the secret Sec into a modal transition
system M#, with distinguished logical states representing the intersection of
L(M) and the complement of Sec.
First, one constructs a complete deterministic LTS A = (Y,Σ, δA, y0) and
a subset of states YF ⊆ Y recognizing Sec from the initial state y0, i.e.,
LYF (A) = Sec. Note that y ∈ YF ⇒ (∀σ ∈ Σ)δA(y, σ) ∈ YF because Sec is
upper-closed w.r.t. the prefix-order on words.
Next, one computes the product M# of M and A. The initial state of
M# is the pair (s0, y0). The set of states S# ⊆ S × Y of M# and the weak
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transition map δ♦# are jointly and inductively defined by setting δ
♦
#((s, y), σ) =
(s′, y′) and (s′, y′) ∈ S# when δ
♦(s, σ) = s′ and δA(y, σ) = y
′. The strong
transition map δ# is defined similarly, but replacing δ
♦(s, σ) with δ(s, σ).
The distinguished logical states SF# of M# are the pairs (s, y) ∈ S# such that
y ∈ YF . Then the following property holds:
∀w ∈ L(M#), w ∈ Sec if and only if δ
♦
#(s0, w) ∈ S
F
#
Furthermore, since the automaton A is complete,
L(M) = L(M#) and G |=M ⇔ G |=M# for all G (over Σ)
Example 7 Consider the MTS M1 of Example 1 and Sec = Σ
∗.a.a.b.b.Σ∗. The
complete deterministic automaton A that recognizes Sec is given in Figure 9
with YF = {5},
1 2 3 4 5
b
a
b
a b b
a
a, ba
Fig. 9 A recognizing Sec
whereas, M# is depicted in Figure 10 with S
F
# = {6, 7, 8, 9}. ⋄
1 2 3 4
5
6 7 8 9
a
a b
b a
b
a
b
a a
b
a
b
b
Fig. 10 M#
In the remainder of Section 4, we assume without loss of generality, and
for simplicity of notation, that M = M# and we let S
F = SF#, thus Sec =
LSF (M). Moreover, as the predicate Sec is upper-closed, s ∈ S
F ⇒ δ♦(s, σ) ∈
SF if the latter is defined.
4.2 The general schema
In this section, we sketch the intuitions under the methods that will be em-
ployed for solving Problem 1. Following Definitions 6 and 7, our aim is to
Enforcing Opacity of Regular Predicates on Modal Transition Systems 15
compute the maximally permissive controller K such that the secret is opaque
with respect to K/G and Σa for every LTS G |=M .
As Σo = Σ and L(M) = L(M) is the supremum of L(G) for all labelled
transition systems G |= M , in order that a controller K may be admissi-
ble for every model G of M , it is necessary and sufficient that L(K) sat-
isfies the controllability constraint w.r.t. L(M) and Σc (Section 2.3), i.e.,
w.σ ∈ L(M) ⇒ w.σ ∈ L(K) for any word w ∈ L(M) ∩ L(K) and for any
uncontrollable action σ ∈ Σ \Σc. Note that, as the controller has full observa-
tion (Σo = Σ), the observability constraint (Section 2.3) is necessary satisfied.
When the controllability constraint is satisfied, we say that K is an admissible
controller of M (w.r.t. Σc and Σo = Σ).
Among the admissible controllers of M , we should search for controllers
K ensuring the opacity of the secret, i.e., such that the following condition
holds for every labelled transition system G |= M (recall that K/G denotes
the product of G and K):
∀w ∈ L(K/G), ∃w′ ∈ L(K/G), w ∼a w
′ ∧ δ♦(s0, w
′) /∈ SF .
We want to compute the maximally permissive controller K satisfying this
condition. We proceed in two steps.
– In a first step, we derive from M an LTS H such that L(H) = L(M). The
set of states of H is included in S × P(S), where P(S) denotes the power
set of S. The meaning of these states is as follows. If δ♦(s0, w) = s in M ,
then w leads in H to the state (s, E) defined by
E = {s′ ∈ S| ∃w′ ∈ L(w ◦M) : w ∼a w
′ ∧ δ♦(s0, w
′) = s′}
– In a second step, we trim H according to Ramadge and Wonham’s proce-
dure to avoid reaching any state (s, E), where E ⊆ SF .
We will show that the labelled transition system K† obtained in this way is
the maximally permissive controller that enforces the opacity of Sec in M .
4.3 A preliminary construction
In the sequel, M = (S,Σ, δ, δ♦, s0), S
F ⊆ S, Sec = LSF (M), and the set
Σua = Σ \ Σa denotes the set of actions which are unobservable from the
perspective of the attacker. For all transition maps δ, for all sets of states E and
for all L ⊆ Σ∗, we let δ(E, σ) = {δ(s, σ) | s ∈ E}, δ(s, L) = {δ(s, w) |w ∈ L},
and δ(E,L) = {δ(s, w) | s ∈ E ∧ w ∈ L}.
Definition 8 Let H = (Θ,Σ, δH , θ0) be the LTS with the set of states Θ ⊆
S × P(S) (where P(S) denotes the powerset of S) and the labelled transition
map δH jointly and inductively defined as follows:
• let θ0 = (s0, δ
(s0, Σ
∗
ua)) and θ0 ∈ Θ,
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• inductively, for each state (s, E) ∈ Θ and for each action σ ∈ Σ such
that δ♦(s, σ) is defined, let δH((s, E), σ) = (s
′, E′) and (s′, E′) ∈ Θ where
s′ = δ♦(s, σ) and the set of states E′ is given according to the case by:
– σ /∈ Σa: E
′ = E ∪ δ(s′, Σ∗ua),
– σ ∈ Σa: E
′ = δ(E, σ.Σ∗ua) ∪ δ
(s′, Σ∗ua).
Obviously, L(H) = L(M) (because we inductively define s′ = δ♦(s, σ) when
computing δH), and s ∈ E for every state (s, E) ∈ Θ.
Example 8 To illustrate the construction of H, let us turn our attention to the
MTS depicted in Figure 10 with Σa = {a}. The LTS derived from this MTS ac-
cording to Definition 8 is depicted in Figure 11, where states (s, {s1, s2, · · · , sn})
are represented as pairs s, s1.s2 · · · sn.
1,1 2,2 3,3.4
5,2.51,1.2.5 4,3.4 6,3.4.6 8,8.9
7,2.7 9,2.7.9
7,7
6,2.6.7.9
9,6.7.9
9,8.9 6,6.8.9 9,7.9
a a
a
a
a
b
b
a
a bab
a a
ba
a
b
a
b
b
a
b b
Fig. 11 H computed from M♯ (Figure 10)
⋄
The following lemma, which is a bit technical, shows that the above construc-
tion achieves the goals announced in section 4.2.
Lemma 4 For any w ∈ L(M), δH(θ0, w) = (s, E) ⇒ s = δ
♦(s0, w) and
E = {s′ ∈ S | ∃w′ ∈ L(w ◦M) : w′ ∼a w ∧ δ
♦(s0, w
′) = s′}.
Proof. The proof is by induction on w. The base of the induction is given by
the case w = ε. Then δH(θ0, ε) = θ0 = (s0, δ
(s0, Σ
∗
ua)) by Def. 8. Clearly,
s0 = δ
♦(s0, ε). For w
′ ∈ Σ∗, w′ ∈ Σ∗ua ⇔ w
′ ∼a ε, and δ
(s0, w
′) is defined if
and only if w′ ∈ L(M) = L(ε ◦ M) (Lemma 1). As δ♦(s0, w
′) = δ(s0, w
′) if
the latter is defined, the lemma holds for w = ε.
Assume now that the lemma holds for w = σ1 . . . σn−1 (by convention, n =
1 means w = ε), and consider w.σn ∈ L(M) with σn ∈ Σ. Let δH(θ0, σ1 . . . σi) =
(si, Ei) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As sn = δ
♦(sn−1, σn) (by Def. 8) and sn−1 = δ
♦(s0, w)
(by the induction hypothesis), sn = δ
♦(s0, w.σn). To simplify the notation, let
σ = σn and s = sn, hence s = δ
♦(s0, w.σ).
We prove En = {s
′ ∈ S | ∃w′ ∈ L((w.σ)◦M) : w′ ∼a w.σ ∧ δ
♦(s0, w
′) = s′}
by case analysis.
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Case σ /∈ Σa. By Def. 8, En = En−1 ∪ δ
(s,Σ∗ua), and by induction,
En−1 = {s
′ ∈ S | ∃w′ ∈ L(w ◦M) : w′ ∼a w ∧ δ
♦(s0, w
′) = s′}. As w ∼a w.σ
and L((w.σ) ◦M) = L(w ◦M)∪w.σ.L(M, s) (Lemma 2), it suffices to prove:
δ(s,Σ∗ua) = {s
′ ∈ S | ∃w′ ∈ w.σ.L(M, s) : w′ ∼a w.σ ∧ δ
♦(s0, w
′) = s′}.
Now, s′ ∈ δ(s,Σ∗ua) is and only if s
′ = δ(s, v′) for some v′ ∈ Σ∗ua, and
δ(s, v′) is defined and equal to δ♦(s, v′), if and only if v′ ∈ L(M, s). As
s = δ♦(s0, w.σ), it follows that s
′ ∈ δ(s,Σ∗ua) if and only if s
′ ∈ δ♦(s, w.σ.v′)
for some v′ ∈ Σ∗ua ∩ L(M, s), if and only if s
′ ∈ δ♦(so, w
′) for some w′ ∈
w.σ.L(M, s) satisfying w′ ∼a w.σ. Therefore, the lemma holds in this case.
Case σ ∈ Σa. By Def. 8, En = δ
(En−1, σ.Σ
∗
ua) ∪ δ
(s,Σ∗ua) and by
induction, En−1 = {s
′ ∈ S | ∃w′ ∈ L(w ◦M) : w′ ∼a w ∧ δ
♦(s0, w
′) = s′}.
Accordingly, δ(En−1, σ.Σ
∗
ua) = {s
′′ ∈ S | ∃s′ ∈ S ∃w′ ∈ L(w ◦M) ∃v′ ∈ Σ∗ua :
w′ ∼a w ∧ δ
♦(s0, w
′) = s′ ∧ δ(s′, σ.v′) = s′′}. For s′, w′ and v′ as above, let
w′′ = w′.σ.v′. As w′ ∈ L(w ◦M) and δ♦(s0, w
′) = s′, δ(s′, σ.v′) is defined
if and only if w′′ ∈ L(w ◦M), and then δ♦(s0, w”) = δ
(s′, σ.v′). Moreover,
w′′ ∼a w
′.σ ∼a w.σ. Conversely, any w
′′ ∈ L(w ◦M) such that w′′ ∼a w.σ
decomposes as w′′ = w′.σ.v′ with w′ ∈ L(w ◦M), w′ ∼a w, and v
′ ∈ Σ∗ua.
The above relation simplifies therefore to δ(En−1, σ.Σ
∗
ua) = {s
′′ ∈ S | ∃w′′ ∈
L(w ◦M) : w′′ ∼a w.σ ∧ δ
♦(s0, w
′′) = s′′}. As L((w.σ) ◦M) = L(w ◦M) ∪
w.σ.L(M, s) (Lemma 2), in order to complete the proof, it suffices to show
that δ(s,Σ∗ua) = {s
′′ ∈ S | ∃v′ ∈ L(M, s) : w.σ.v′ ∼a w.σ ∧ δ
♦(s0, w.σ.v
′) =
s′′}. This follows easily because w.σ.v′ ∼a w.σ if and only if v
′ ∈ Σ∗ua and
δ♦(s0, w.σ.v
′) = δ(s, v′) if the latter is defined. 
4.4 The construction of K†
As in the previous section,M = (S,Σ, δ, δ♦, s0), S
F ⊆ S, Sec = LSF (M) and
H = (Θ,Σ, δH , θ0). Since Θ ⊆ S ×P(S) where S is the set of logical states of
M , H is a finite LTS, with the language L(H) = L(M) = ∪{L(G) |G |= M}.
Our goal is to produce K† from H by removing all words w ∈ L(H) that
disclose the secret Sec in some model G of M .
As L(w ◦ M) is the infimum of L(G) for all G such that G |= M and
w ∈ L(G) (Proposition 1), a word w ∈ L(H) discloses the secret Sec in some
model of M if and only if it discloses the secret Sec in w ◦M . By Lemma 4, a
word w ∈ L(H) discloses the secret Sec in w◦M if and only if δH(θ0, w) ∈ Bad
0
where we let
Bad0 = {(s, E) ∈ Θ |E ⊆ SF }.
Enforcing the opacity of the secret Sec in all models of M amounts therefore
to barring access to bad states of H, i.e., to states in Bad0.
As L(H) = ∪{L(G) |G |= M}, the controllability constraint L(K).Σuc ∩
L(G) ⊆ L(K) holds for all models G of M is and only if it holds for L(H),
hence a controller K is an admissible controller of all models G of M if and
only if it is an admissible controller of H.
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So, in order for K = (X,Σ, δK , x0) to enforce the opacity of the secret Sec
in every model G of M (w.r.t. Σa) and to be an admissible controller of G
(w.r.t. Σc), it is necessary that the following two conditions hold:
– no state (θ, x) with θ ∈ Bad0 can be reached from (θ0, x0) in K/H, (C1)
– K is an admissible controller of H (w.r.t. Σc). (C2)
According to Ramadge and Wonham’s theory of state-based supervision, the
maximally permissive controller K† for which both conditions hold is obtained
by pruning H iteratively. Throughout the iteration, one maintains a partition
{Good,Bad} of the set of states X = Θ and a partial transition map δX :
Θ × Σ → Θ. Good decreases and Bad increases while δX gets less and less
defined at each step. The algorithm is at follows:
– Initially, Good0 = X \Bad0 and δX = δH .
– at step n+ 1 in the iteration:
– initially, one lets Badn+1 = Badn,
– for all pairs of arguments θ ∈ Goodn and σ ∈ Σ such that δX(θ, σ) ∈
Badn:
• one removes (θ, σ) from the domain of definition of δX ,
• if σ is uncontrollable (σ /∈ Σc), then one adds the considered state
θ to the set Badn+1,
– finally, one lets Goodn+1 = X \Badn+1,
– the global iteration stops when δX(θ, σ) ∈ Bad
n for no pair of arguments
θ ∈ Goodn and σ ∈ Σ,
At termination of the algorithm, let Good = Goodn and Bad = X \ Goodn,
then K† is the induced restriction of the LTS (Good,Σ, δX , θ0) on the states
reachable from θ0.
– If θ0 /∈ Good, then no controller can prevent Bad states from being reached
(hence no controller can enforce the opacity of the secret in all models of
MTS).
– If θ0 ∈ Good, then K
† is the maximally permissive controller preventing
states in Bad0 from being reached in H.
However, this does not entail directly thatK† enforces the opacity of the secret
in all models of MTS, since (C1) and (C2) were only necessary conditions for
achieving this goal. The following lemma is crucial to prove that K† enforces
indeed the opacity of the secret in all models of MTS.
Lemma 5 If the iterative procedure defined above is applied to the LTS H
specified by Definition 8 and to the set Bad0 = {(s, E) ∈ Θ |E ⊆ SF }, then
s ∈ SF for every state (s, E) of H that is eventually turned to Bad.
Proof. – We consider first the case where Σa ⊆ Σc. We show that in this
case, the set Bad stays equal to Bad0. At step n+1 in the iteration, assume
by induction on n that Badn = Bad0, and let δH((s, E), σ) = (s
′, E′) for
some σ ∈ Σ \Σc and (s
′, E′) ∈ Badn. As Σa ⊆ Σc, σ ∈ Σ \Σa. By Def. 8,
E ⊆ E′. As E′ ⊆ SF , E ⊆ SF and (s, E) ∈ Bad0, hence Badn+1 = Bad0.
Moreover, s ∈ E ⊆ SF entails s ∈ SF for every state (s, E) ∈ Bad = Bad0.
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– We consider next the case where Σa, Σc ⊆ Σo = Σ and wσ ∈ Sec ⇒ w ∈
Sec for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σc, i.e., δ
♦(s, σ) ∈ SF ⇒ s ∈ SF for all σ ∈ Σ \ Σc.
At step n + 1 in the iteration, let δH((s, E), σ) = (s
′, E′) for some σ ∈
Σ \ Σc and (s
′, E′) ∈ Badn. By induction on n, assume that s′ ∈ SF . As
δ♦(s, σ) = s′ and σ ∈ Σ \ Σc, necessarily, s ∈ S
F . Therefore, the proof of
the lemma is complete.

Remark 2 If δH((s, E), σ) = (s
′, E′) for σ ∈ Σc \ Σa then E ⊆ E
′ by Def. 8,
hence (s′, E′) ∈ Bad0 ⇒ (s, E) ∈ Bad0. Therefore, actions σ in Σc \ Σa are
never blocked by K†.
Remark 3 It may occur, for some state (s, E) of K† and for some s′ ∈ E that
K† has no state of the form (s′, E′). In such a case, some state (s′, E′) of
H must have been turned to Bad, hence s′ ∈ SF by Lemma 5. Therefore,
E ∩ (S \ SF ) =(E \ {s′}) ∩ (S \ SF ). This explains why we do not need to
update the second component of a state (s, E) during Ramadge and Wonham’s
iterative cleaning process.
Proposition 2 K† enforces the opacity of the secret Sec in all models G of
M .
Proof. Let G |= M and w ∈ L(K†/G). We must show that there exists
w′ ∈ L(K†/G) such that w ∼a w
′ and δ♦(s0, w
′) /∈ SF (inM). As w ∈ L(K†),
δH(θ0, w) must be a Good state, hence δH(θ0, w) /∈ Bad
0 ⊆ Bad. By Lemma 4
and the definition of the set Bad0, w ∼a w
′ and δ♦(s0, w
′) /∈ SF for some
w′ ∈ L(w ◦M). As G |= M and w ∈ L(G), by proposition 1, w′ ∈ L(G). As
the secret Sec is an upper-closed set, δ♦(s0, w
′) /∈ SF entails δ♦(s0, v
′) /∈ SF
for every prefix v′ of w′. By Lemma 5, δH(s0, v
′) is never turned from Good
to Bad for any prefix v′ of w′. Therefore, w′ ∈ L(K†), and w′ ∈ L(K†/G).

Theorem 1 K† is maximally permissive among all admissible controllers en-
forcing the opacity of the secret in all models of M .
Proof. K† is maximally permissive among the controllers of H that satisfy
the two necessary conditions (C1) and (C2). Proposition 2 completes the proof
of the theorem.
Example 9 In H (Figure 11) computed fromM♯ (Figure 10), Bad
0 is the set of
states (s, E) in which E ⊆ SF = {6, 7, 8, 9}. Ramadge & Wonham’s iteration
converges in one step, producing the controller K† depicted in Figure 12 and
Figure 7. This maximally permissive controller enforces the opacity of the
secret Σ∗.a.a.b.b.Σ∗ in all models of M1 (Figure 1(a)) and in particular in
G1 (Figure 1(c)) and G2 (Figure 1(d)). The controlled systems K
†/G1 and
K†/G2 are depicted in Figure 8. ⋄
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1,1 2,2 3,3.4
5,2.51,1.2.5 4,3.4 6,3.4.6
7,2.7 9,2.7.9
6,2.6.7.9
a a
ba
a
b
a
b
b
a
b
b
Fig. 12 K† for M1
Example 10 Consider the modal transition systemM2 (Figure 1(b)). Given the
secret Sec = Σ∗.a.a.b.b.Σ∗ recognized by the automaton depicted in Figure 9,
the correspondingM♯ is like that in Figure 10, except that transitions 1
a
−→ 2,
2
b
−→ 5, 6
a
−→ 7 and 7
b
−→ 9 are now strong transitions. As before, SF =
{6, 7, 8, 9}. The transition system H computed from M2 and the secret Sec
is shown in Figure 13. As Bad0 is the set of states (s, E) such that E ⊆ SF ,
1,1 2,2.5 3,2.3.4.5
5,2.51,1.2.5 4,2.3.4.5 6,2.3.4.5.6 7,2.5.7.9
8,2.5.7.8.9
9,2.5.7.8.9 6,2.5.6.7.8.9
9,2.5.7.9
6,2.5.6.7.9
a
b
a
b
a
b
a
b
a
a a
ba
a
b
a
b
b a
Fig. 13 H for M2
Bad0 = ∅. Therefore K† = H. As L(H) = L(M2), this means that the secret
Sec is opaque in every model G of M2 and no additional control is needed. ⋄
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